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Abstract 
We analyze the performance of the Maastricht convergence criteria (inflation, long-term 
interest rate, annual and overall public debt) of the European Monetary Union (EMU) that led 
to the introduction of the Euro on Jan. 1st 1999 as book currency. Defining 3 regimes, 1992-
97, 1997-1999 and 2000-2001, we analyse convergence properties, like a smooth or a rough 
transition in the mean or variance shifts between these 3 regimes. Given the regimes, we 
test the convergence in econometric models to see if the first and second moments of the 
convergence process are time dependent. Furthermore we check for a smooth transition 
process between the regimes and if the convergence process has stabilized around a target 
path. We find that the speed of the convergence processes for the monetary authority 
controlled variables (inflation and interest rates) were very different from the government 
controlled variables annual deficit and the public debt. 
 
Keywords 
EMU convergence, Maastricht criteria, heteroskedastic spline models, ARCH regime shifts, 
inflation, public deficits, interest rates and public debt 
JEL Classifications 
C2, E1 
 Comments 
We thank Marco Delvai and Stefano Raffaelli for computing assistance. We also thank two anonymous 
referees for the critical and valuable remarks. 
Contents 
1. Introduction 1 
1.1 Modeling goals and caveats ................................................................................................. 2 
2. The EMU and the Maastricht criteria 4 
2.1 The Maastricht criteria .......................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 The modeling strategy .......................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 The data base....................................................................................................................... 7 
3. The methodology 7 
3.1 Testing in the convergence models ...................................................................................... 9 
4. Main results 11 
4.1 Inflation rates ...................................................................................................................... 11 
4.2 Long-term interest rates...................................................................................................... 15 
4.3 Annual public deficit to GDP............................................................................................... 19 
4.4 Overall public debt ratio to GDP ......................................................................................... 21 
5. Is there convergence in the 2nd moments? 26 
6. Conclusions 28 
References 30 
Appendix: Heteroskedastic convergence models 31 
 
I H S — Polasek, Amplatz / The Maastricht Criteria and the Euro — 1 
1. Introduction  
The EMU presently consists of 12 member states, including Greece, which joined the 
Eurozone in 2001, two years after the start of the new currency in 1999. The performance of 
the EMU countries according to the Maastricht criteria during the years before and after the 
formal launch of the Euro on Jan. 1st 1999 is an important threshold for a common European 
economic policy. With the planned enlargement of the EU, new candidates for Euro-Land will 
have to follow the Maastricht criteria as well. Clearly, the compliance of these prescriptions of 
the Pact on Stability and Growth (PSG: due to 1997) and the various discussions of these 
criteria are a highly political issue and are important for the future stability of the euro. 
Therefore the analysis of the economic convergence process is an important issue that will 
serve as a benchmark for future discussion of the performance of countries in Euro-Land. 
We will adopt an econometric view of the economic convergence process and we will 
analyze the joint time series behavior of the 4 crucial economic indicators (inflation, public 
deficits, interest rates and public debt) over the time period 1992-2001. 
We will consider two models for the modeling of the convergence behavior over the period 
1992-2001: a 2-regime and a 3-regime model. In addition, we will consider a smooth spline 
model and a piecewise regression model where the pieces might not be connected. The 
spline model preserves continuity at the break point while the piecewise regression model 
describes the trend lines independently in two or 3 regimes. 
The description of the convergence process is a simple time trend model that could possibly 
have quite different trends in the consecutive regimes. The 3-regime model introduces a 
second break point at the end of 1999 to describe the performance of the last two years. We 
will test the convergence of the spline and the piecewise linear regression model. 
Furthermore, we distinguish between the following types of convergence processes: 
a) Simple mean convergence: The cross-sectional means of the time series are 
decreasing. 
b) Targeted mean convergence: The cross-sectional means of the time series are 
decreasing to a target level and the cross-sectional variance of the process is also 
decreasing. 
c) Simple variance convergence: The cross-sectional variances of the time series are 
decreasing. 
Simple mean (or variance) divergence: The cross-sectional means (or variances) of the time 
series are increasing. 
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1.1 Modeling goals and caveats 
Clearly, our approach is merely an ex-post statistical measurement of the observed 
movement in the underlying time series for the Maastricht Criteria of the EU countries. Since 
no behavioral assumptions are present in our econometric models, we concentrate on and 
describe the phenomenon of convergence in a statistical sense. A driving role for the 
convergence process is played by expectations and policy credibility, which are rather 
complicated to impose in a descriptive approach and therefore are not considered explicitly 
in this paper. 
Economically, we expect from the results that modeling the convergence process of inflation 
and long-term interest rates on the one side and annual deficits on the other side can be 
quite different. While the criteria for inflation and long-term interest rates were considered to 
be a strict entrance benchmark for the EMU, the criterion for government finances was less 
restrictive. Governments who had the intention to meet the government finance criteria were 
considered to be eligible for Euroland, too. 
We expect that inflation and interest rates, two of the convergence criteria, will have similar 
convergence behavior because of their close economic interrelationship. Indeed, for several 
models inflation depends on the exogenously given level of nominal interest rates (e.g. see 
Dornbusch 1976). On the other hand Central Banks, especially the ECB (see Treaty on EU 
(1999), articles 105-124), set the level of nominal interest rates according to inflationary 
pressure. Moreover, debt ratios and annual deficits also are interrelated. On the other hand, 
convergence performance of these two groups of criteria is not necessarily related to each 
other, especially not in the beginning of the convergence procedure, i.e. in our notation for 
the Maastricht regime. The reason for this is that fiscal convergence is driven by business 
cycles and fiscal discipline. 
Fiscal discipline, though, has certainly improved in the Eurozone by the PSG. Unfortunately, 
the problem of business cycles affecting government budgets was not taken into account by 
the PSG, since it focuses on annual deficits instead of business cycle independent structural 
deficits. This shows certain weaknesses of the two fiscal Maastricht criteria and the PSG. 
Thus there is possibly room for improving rules of the PSG in the future. 
Furthermore, we argue that the PSG is not necessarily satisfactory, neither for guaranteeing 
stabilization of achieved convergence of interest rates and inflation nor for implementing a 
consistent long-term trend towards perfect convergence of the Maastricht criteria nor for 
necessarily achieving economic convergence. The reason is that the PSG may create 
incentives for fiscal discipline and thus for fiscal convergence, but it does not necessarily 
imply economic convergence (e.g. in the sense of similar income levels or growth rates) nor 
convergence in the sense of converging interest rates and inflation. 
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Still concerning the PSG, we conclude that there is a principal-agency problem. Indeed, 
member countries have fewer incentives for further improving or at least stabilizing 
convergence, once they joined the Euro. Thus there is some evidence for divergence in the 
Euroland regime concerning several criteria. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
concept of convergence is highly time dependent. In fact we conclude that different time 
periods may show totally different convergence performance. 
Greece is treated as a special case in this paper because of its different economic stage 
compared to other EMU members. Analysis without Greece deals with the fact of its being an 
outlier, but at the same time it allows classifying the convergence performance of Greece 
when comparing to results including Greece. In this sense Greece is somewhat like a 
pioneer for the coming eastern enlargement. Once the “eastern enlargement” of the EU has 
taken place, discussion about the adoption of the Euro in those new member countries will 
arise. 
Furthermore we are interested in the question if the convergence process in the first 
moments (i.e. the mean equation of the spline model) was accompanied by a convergence 
process in the 2nd moments. This means that we fit a heteroskedastic 2- or 3-regime 
convergence model for the conditional variances of the piecewise regression models. 
Thus, it is not surprising that after the introduction of the Euro not all the countries fulfill the 
restriction of the maximum 60% debt to GDP ratio: 5 and 6 countries are not able do so in 
2000 and 2001 respectively. We will see that the convergence for inflation and interest rates, 
– these are the two criteria depending on efficient financial and goods and services markets 
– already took place in the first regime before 1997. This is a clear indication that real 
economic convergence can be achieved more quickly than fiscal discipline for the public 
sector. 
We also want to emphasize that the proposed convergence model is motivated by the 
econometric technique of spline models and has nothing to do with the approaches to 
economic convergence as in Barro et al. (1995) or Ben-David (1993). Different ideas 
regarding economic convergence by index construction can be found in Hobijn and Franses 
(2000, 2001). 
The plan of the paper is as follows: We start in section 1 with an introduction to the modeling 
process; the data base and the Maastricht criteria are described in section 2. In section 3 we 
briefly outline our econometric convergence approach while in section 4 we report the 
results. Section 5 reports the results of the heteroskedastic convergence models. The last 
section concludes. The appendix summarizes the heteroskedastic convergence models. 
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2. The EMU and the Maastricht criteria  
First, let us consider a short historical overview of the EMU. The Maastricht treaty laid out 
three stages to arrange the EMU:  
Stage 1, July 1990 – Dec 1993:  
• Free movement of capital, 
• Narrowing of ERM band, 
• Closer co-operation between central banks, 
• Closer co-ordination of economic policies. 
Stage 2, Jan. 1994 – Dec 1998:  
• Convergence of member states' economic and monetary policies, 
• Establishment of European Central Bank, 
• Independence of national banks, 
• Participating countries fix their exchange rates. 
Stage 3, Jan. 1999: Introduction of the Euro as a book currency, 
• Jan. 2002: Launch of euro notes and coins. 
In 1998, 11 of the 15 EU member states decided to form the European monetary union 
(EMU), leaving Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the UK outside the “eurozone”.  
In January 1999, financial markets of the EMU countries began operating in euros. Two 
years later, Greece finally met the economic requirements for membership and at the Lisbon 
meeting in June 2000 Greece was allowed to join the euro in January 2001.  
2.1 The Maastricht criteria 
We consider the twelve countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU): 
Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal are the founding states and Greece joined two years later. The other three 
EU states, Britain, Denmark, and Sweden have not joined the Euro.  
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) contains important macro-economic requirements in order to 
become a member of Euroland, i.e. to participate in the EMU. The treaty lists 4 types of 
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criteria that are slightly different from the 4 “Maastricht” criteria, which we will use for the 
analyses of the convergence process. The 3rd point mentioned in the treaty deals with 
exchange rates, but this was only important before the official launch of the Euro on Jan. 1st 
1999.  Therefore we have not considered exchange rates for the present analysis, and we 
investigate the behavior of government budgets – according to common practice – by two 
important time series, the annual deficit and the debt ratio. 
1. PRICE STABILITY 
"The achievement of a high degree of price stability [...] will be apparent from a rate of 
inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms 
of price stability." 
In practice, the inflation rate of a given member state must not exceed the inflation rate of the 
three best-performing member states in terms of price stability during the year preceding the 
examination of the situation in the given member state by more than 1½ percentage points. 
2. GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
"The sustainability of the government financial position [...] will be apparent from having 
achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive [...]." 
In practice, the Commission, when drawing up its annual recommendation to the Council of 
Finance Ministers, examines compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the 
following two criteria: 
a) The annual government deficit: the ratio of the annual government deficit to gross 
domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding financial year. 
If this is not the case, the ratio must have declined substantially and continuously and 
reached a level close to 3% (interpretation in trend terms) or, alternatively, must remain 
close to 3% while representing only an exceptional and temporary excess; 
b) Government debt: the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at 
the end of the preceding financial year. If this is not the case, the ratio must have 
sufficiently diminished and must be approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace (interpretation in trend terms).  
3. EXCHANGE RATES 
"The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing 
against the currency of any other Member State." 
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This criterion is not relevant for this study, as we only look at the performance of countries 
already being members with a common currency. 
4. LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
"The durability of convergence achieved by the Member State [...] being reflected in the long-
term interest-rate levels." 
In practice, the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed that of the three best-
performing Member States in terms of price stability by more than 2 percentage points. Note 
that this refers to the same Member States as in the case of the price stability criterion. The 
crucial period is the year preceding the examination of the Member State for joining the euro. 
Therefore we will focus our analysis on the inflation rates, the nominal long-term interest 
rates, annual government deficits and total public debt of each member, while simply 
ignoring the criterion regarding exchange rates, as it is obsolete now. 
2.2 The modeling strategy 
The empirical strategy employed in the paper implicitly assumes that there is a common 
(across member states) 'generating mechanism'. The implicit assumption is a common 
cross-sectional time trend according to Quah (1993). According to this view, our modeling 
proposal considers the fact that the time series do not follow a uniform linear trend but 
perhaps a broken, segmented, possibly piecewise connected (“smooth”) trend. For each 
Maastricht criterion we will estimate a convergence model across the 12 EMU members and 
results of the convergence performance will be obtained independently for the four variables. 
We will treat the convergence modeling as a model selection problem: We look for the best 
performing parsimonious convergence model. Thus, this approach requires many estimates 
because different piecewise linear regression models have to be compared to each other. 
Furthermore, we have to cope with outliers? exceptions, since Greece in particular is a 
special case for the convergence models. Greek time series can be considered to document 
a previous unseen catching-up process and therefore it is not surprising that Greek time 
series are “outliers” in the sense of showing more extreme values in the first years of the 
convergence process if compared to other countries. 
Unfortunately, from an econometric point of view, the Greek time series create a technical 
difficulty in the assumption that the convergence process in the Maastricht regime stems 
from a data generating process of the EU countries, which is “uniform”. That means they 
agree at the same time to similar economic policy measures, they have the same time 
horizon to meet their goals, and they have roughly comparable starting conditions. Therefore 
the fact that Greece entered the EMU in 2001, after the introduction of the Euro by the other 
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countries, distorts the estimation of the convergence process (due to a single country) and 
has an “outlier bias” effect on the least squares estimates. 
To find out how big this effect of distortion can be on the estimates, we will analyze the 
convergence in our models without Greece (and occasionally without other “outlying” 
countries) to see its influence on the overall convergence behavior. Furthermore, we will 
check the analysis of overall public debt for outlying countries. As Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Italy and Greece all show extreme debt values compared to the other 8 countries (i.e. 
Luxembourg has a very low one, the other three a very high one), we will estimate the 
regression model for the group of 8 middle or “core“ countries. 
2.3 The data base 
Data for EMU members are taken from Eurostat on a monthly or a yearly basis. The inflation 
rate is calculated from the price index (source: Datastream, IMF) from Sept. 1991 to Sept. 
2001. For the interest rates we had to start the convergence analysis in April 1994 since the 
data were not available or comparable before 1994. The long-term interest rate for each 
country is the “Benchmark Bond 10 yr (DS)”. 
The monthly time series on the interest rate and the inflation were available up to September 
2001. Finally the annual time series on annual deficit to GDP and overall public debt to GDP 
are based on OECD forecasts for the year 2001, since they are the only annual data sets 
that are available.  
After calculating the mean of the three best performing countries for inflation rates each 
month, we subtract it from all national inflation rates for comparative purposes. The same 
procedure is applied to interest rates. Data for annual and overall public debt are all in 
absolute percentage terms to GDP. They are due to an OECD database for forecasts, annual 
reports of the European Central Bank for 1998 to 2000 and Eurostat, covering the years from 
1990 to 1997. These data sets for the four criteria are sufficient for our research objective. 
3. The methodology 
To find out whether the convergence process of the Maastricht treaty has not eroded but 
continued in the two years since the introduction of the Euro, we suggest to model the 
convergence path for the EMU member states over the last decade by a piecewise 
regression model. By looking at the graphs of the individual time series for the convergence 
models, it is quite evident that there was an important change in the convergence process at 
the end of 1997. Indeed, there was a European Council meeting in Amsterdam on June 17th 
1997, which agreed on the so-called Pact of Stability and Growth (PSG). This political 
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decision made clear that the admittance of countries into Euroland would be based on hard 
economic facts. The pact enforces also the fulfillment of EMU criteria over the next years. 
Maybe it was not as important as the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was, but it provided market 
participants with really strong expectations for convergence to take place. We will show, 
though, that the convergence for inflation and interest rates of EMU members, which are the 
two criteria depending on efficient financial and goods & services markets, already 
approached a similar level in member countries before. This may partly be due to real 
economic convergence already starting before and partly due to expectations of market 
participants already anticipating real events. 
Our convergence modeling is based on a separate and a continuous piecewise linear 
regression model for a pooled cross-section and time series data set. We first introduce the 
so-called continuous piecewise regression or spline model (see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1998) using dummy variables for the known break point x* which is assumed at the end of 
1997.  
The 2-regime spline model is given by 
(1) yt = b0 + b1 xt + b2 (xt – x*)Dt + ut , Var (ut) = s2, 
whereby the dummy variable is defined as 
(2)  Dt = 1 for xt > x*  and  Dt = 0 else (for xt < x*).  
This leads to the two regression lines before and after the break point x* which has the 
property that 
 Dt = 0:   yt = b0 + b1 xt + ut,  for xt < x*, 
 Dt = 1:   yt = b0* + b1* xt + ut,  for xt > x*, 
The coefficients for regime 2 are b0* = b0 – b2 x* and  b1* = b1 + b2. 
The 2-regime separate regression model has the form of a regression model with a 
“multiplicative dummy” variable where we use the regressor xt – x*: 
(3) yt = b’0 + b1 (xt – x*)  + a0 Dt + a1 (xt – x*) Dt + ut , Var (ut) = s2, 
In this model the regressor variable  xt – x* = t – t*  is the break point adjusted time variable 
and it shifts the coordinate system into the break point t*. Therefore a0 and b’0 are the 
intercepts of the two independent trends while a1 and b1 are the slopes of the two regimes. 
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The 2-piece separate regression model (3) is the unrestricted model and it contains the 2-
regime spline model (1) as special case. Therefore the hypothesis of a continuous trend can 
be tested if the coefficient a0 = 0, i.e. a simple t-test.  
The 3-regime separate regression model has the form 
(4) yt = b0 + b1 (xt – xa*)  + a0 Dat + a1 (xt – xa*) Dat + c0 Dct + c1 (xt – xc*) Dct  + ut , 
 Var (ut) = s2. 
Dat is the dummy variable for the regime A, i.e. Dat = 1 for xt > xa* and Dat = 0 else; and Dct is 
the dummy variable for the regime C, i.e. Dct = 1 for xt > xc* and Dct = 0 else. Now xa* is the 
known break point for the regime A and xc* is the known break point for the regime C. 
 Maastricht regime Amsterdam regime Euroland regime 
|_______________________|___________________|___________________| 
t = 1   97M12 = xa*            99M12 = xc*  t = T 
regime:      A   B           C 
Scheme 1: The regimes for testing the convergence model 
One break point xa* is only needed to estimate the two-regime model while two break points 
xa* is xc* are needed to estimate the 3-regime spline model. The first break point is assumed 
to be December 1997 as 1997 was the crucial year for the final decision on the countries that 
were allowed to adopt the Euro. This decision on the EMU was to be made in the middle of 
1998 after the 1997 data for the convergence criteria being available. The second break 
point xc* marks the starting point of the Euro as a book currency, and we choose for data 
compatibility reasons December 1999. We will call the first regime the “Maastricht regime” 
and the second regime until the end of 1999 when the Euro was created as the “Amsterdam 
regime”.  The third regime is the “Euroland regime”. 
3.1 Testing in the convergence models 
We will test the following 4 hypotheses for the piecewise regression models (continuous or 
separate): 
Hypothesis 1: The EMU countries have reached convergence in the Maastricht regime.  
Then the pooled trend coefficient has to be negative (and the intercepts should be positive). 
If countries had had no interests in the Maastricht convergence process then on average 
they would have maintained their old economic policy and the pooled trend coefficient would 
10 — Polasek, Amplatz / The Maastricht Criteria and the Euro — I H S 
be zero. This leads to the one-sided hypotheses that the countries have not reached 
convergence as being the null-hypothesis, and the hypotheses 
 H0: b1 = 0  vs.  H1: b1 < 0. 
Hypothesis 2: The EMU countries have stabilized the convergence process in the 
Amsterdam regime. 
This implies a simple t-test for the slope coefficient in the 2nd regime: 
 H0: b1* = 0  vs.  H1 : b1* ≠ 0. 
Hypothesis 3: The EMU countries have not diverged in the Euroland regime. 
Again, this implies a one-sided t-test for the slope coefficient in the 3rd regime: 
 H0: b1* = 0  vs.  H1: b1* > 0. 
In contrast to the separate 3-regime regression model in (4) we can estimate the 3-regime 
continuous spline model: 
(5) yt = b0 + b1 (xt – xa*)  + a1 (xt – xa*) Dat + c1 (xt – xc*) Dct  + ut , Var(ut)= s2, 
Therefore we compare the separate 3-regime regression model with the continuous spline 
model by an F-test on: 
Hypothesis 4: The EMU countries have stabilized convergence in the Amsterdam and the 
Euroland regime in a continuous way (smooth transition). 
The compound hypothesis is that the restricted model holds: 
H0: a0 = 0  and  c0 = 0    vs.  H1: a0 ≠ 0  or  c0 ≠ 0 . 
A smooth transition is preferred if the spline model is more likely than the piecewise 3-regime 
model. Instead of the F-test we can also use a likelihood ratio test or we simply compare the 
models by information criteria like AIC (Akaike 1973), or the Schwartz criterion. Thus, our 
approach tries to find stylized facts in the spirit of a critical empirical analysis as proposed by 
Popper (2000). 
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Hypothesis 5: The EMU countries have achieved a) convergence also with respect to the 
variance in the Maastricht regime and b) have not diverged in variance during the 
Amsterdam and Euroland regime. 
Let αtime,  βtime and γtime be the coefficient of the TIME variable in the variance equation of the 
3-regime ARCH regression model (see appendix), then the two hypotheses imply: 
 a) H0: αtime <= 0    vs.   H1: αtime > 0 ; 
 b) H0: βtime = γtime = 0    vs.   H1: βtime = γtime ≠ 0. 
We shall denote a convergence process in a certain regime a “targeted convergence” if the 
TIME coefficients in both, the mean and the variance equation, are significantly different from 
zero and negative. If the regime dependent TIME coefficients are positive then the process is 
called in this regime divergent. If the TIME coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero then there is no convergence (or divergence) for the given partition of the process into 
regimes. 
In the next section we report the main results of the convergence models. 
4. Main results 
In the following section we compare the estimation results of different convergence models 
for each Maastricht criterion. 
4.1  Inflation rates 
The estimates for the 2-regime spline regression that includes all the 12 members are 
(values within brackets are p-values): 
 Before 98M1: Infl.differential = 3.175 – 0.029*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 After 97M12: Infl.differential =  0.773 + 0.002*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.0001)  (0.0000) 
On average the inflation differential in Euroland with respect to the mean of the three best 
performing countries decreased from 3.17 % to only 0.96% at the end of 1997 (about 3 basis 
points per month). Surprisingly, there was no continued convergence in the second 
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Amsterdam regime. Since the regression coefficient is positive there was actually a small 
divergence, namely 0.2 basis points per month with the inflation rate differential increasing to 
1.08% at the end of the second regime. Regression estimates are all significantly different 
from 0 (p-value = 0.0001).  
Since Greece data behave like those of outlying countries/non-members, we have estimated 
the 2-regime model for 11 EMU countries.  
 Before 98M1:  Infl.differential =  1.960 – 0.017*Time 
 (p-values)     (0.0000)     (0.0000) 
 After 97M12:  Infl.differential =   -0.047 +  0.010*Time 
 (p-values)     (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
The estimates for the 11 countries show a lower pace of convergence (1.7 basis points 
compared to 2.9 per month) in the first regime. Again, we see a divergence of 1 basis point 
for the second regime which is considerably higher than for the first regime. The differential 
is 1.96% for September 1991, 0.68% for December 1997 and 1.11% for September 2001.  
Next we want to check if the divergence process has continued for the 3rd regime in 
Euroland between 2000 and 2001 (again without Greece) without Greece: 
 Before 98M1:    Infl.differential =  1.956 – 0.017*Time 
 (p-values)     (0.000)  (0.000) 
From 98M1 to 99M12:   Infl.differential =  0.063 + .008*Time 
 (p-values)     (0.000)  (0.010) 
 After 99M12:  Infl.differential = -0.392 + 0.013*Time 
 (p-values)      (0.000)  (0.7676) 
 
While the slope coefficient in the 3rd regime is not significant, the positive slope in the 2nd 
regime is. This can be seen as the result of an increased spread in the inflation rates in the 
Euroland regime. Note that hypothesis 3, i.e. the divergence of countries during the Euroland 
regime, cannot be confirmed significantly by the t test. 
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Figure 1: Inflation differential for the 3-regime spline model (break points at 97M12 
and 99M12) without Greece 
 
Finally we test the hypothesis that the transition between the regimes was smooth for the 
inflation rates. The separate 3-regime model is estimated as: 
 Before 98M1: Infl.differential =  1.973  –  0.017*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
From 98M1 to 99M12: Infl.differential = 0.589  +  0.003*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.1915)  (0.0970) 
 After 99M12: Infl.differential   = -0.696  +  0.016*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.1014)  (0.0267) 
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Figure 2: Inflation differential for a separate 3-regime regression for 11 EMU countries 
 
The estimates are rejecting the convergence hypothesis for the last regime and the 1.6 basis 
points divergence is significant. Moreover, note the divergence for the years 1998 and 1999. 
Indeed, the slope coefficient is significantly different from 0 (α = 10%) and the F-test is 
significant as well (p-value < .0001). 
Concerning the third hypothesis about the number of regimes, we see a clear preference for 
the 3-regime model. (The AIC value for the 3-regime model is –5.884 while the AIC value for 
the 2-regime model is –4.660). The likelihood ratio test between the 2 models is highly 
significant, too. This means that the whole convergence process happened in the Maastricht 
regime while the stabilisation process for the Amsterdam and the Euroland regime is quite 
different.  
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For the 4th hypothesis about the smooth transition we find almost identical AIC and log-
likelihood values for both models. Therefore we will prefer the smooth transition model 
according to the principle of parsimony (i.e. the smallest number of parameters). 
Conclusion 1: The convergence for the inflation rate in the EMU countries happened 
statistically significant during the Maastricht regime. For the 2nd regime and the 3rd regime we 
find a flat regression line (i.e. a levelling off) and the smooth transition model is supported by 
the data. From January ‘00 to September ’01 we detect a small but non-significant 
divergence between the inflation rates. 
4.2 Long-term interest rates 
The 2-regime spline model for the 12 EMU members is estimated as: 
 Before 98M1: Int.differential =  2.990   –  0.048*Time 
       (p-values)    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 After 97M12: Int.differential =   1.500  –  0.015*Time 
        (p-values)    (0.0000)  (0.0015) 
Thus, from April 1994 to December 1997, the monthly convergence was on average 4.8 
basis points. The long-term interest rate differential – based on the mean of the three best 
performing countries – has on average decreased from 3% to 0.8% at the end of the first 
regime, 1997. There has been additional convergence for the second regime of 1.5 basis 
points with the differential decreasing to quite a low value: less than 0.2%. The results are all 
significant at a 1% level (including the F-statistic).  
16 — Polasek, Amplatz / The Maastricht Criteria and the Euro — I H S 
 
Figure 3: Convergence of the interest rate differential in the 2-regime spline model 
(of 12 EMU countries). The time series of Greece acts as an outlier. Note 
the bias of the trend in the second regime due to Greece. 
 
The spline estimate without Greece is: 
 Before 98M1: Int.differential =   2.200  –   0.045*Time 
 (p-values)    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 After 97M12: Int.differential =   0.220  –  0.001*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
The 11 countries of Euroland show a good convergence trend (4.5 basis points per month) 
for the interest rates in the first regime. The convergence has stabilized over the last 2 
regimes, and seemed to have been more constant than for the inflation rates. The estimated 
differential with respect to the 3 best performing countries is 2.2% for April 1994, 0.2% for 
December 1997 and about 0.15% for September 2001. As only the latter value is similar to 
I H S — Polasek, Amplatz / The Maastricht Criteria and the Euro — 17 
that of the regression including Greece, this shows the size of the distortion effect, although 
it is vanishing over time.  
The 3-regime spline model (again without Greece) was estimated as: 
Before 98M1: Int.differential =  2.177 – 0.043*Time 
     (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
From 98M1 to 99M12: Int.differential = 0.535 – 0.007*Time 
      (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
After 99M12: Int.differential = -0.585 + 0.009*Time 
       (p-values)      (0.0000)  (0.2016) 
The slope coefficient is (statistically) significant in the second regime but not so for the 3rd 
regime. Practically the convergence process for the interest rates has already been flat in the 
2nd regime and has stabilized in the 3rd regime. Clearly, the variance reduction is impressive 
for the Maastricht regime, as we see from Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The 3-regime spline convergence model for interest rate differentials 
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The estimation for the separate 2-piece linear regression model without Greece is: 
 Before 98M1: Int.differential =   2.151 – 0.042*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 From 98M1 to 99M12: Int.differential =  0.176 – 0.001*Time 
 (p-values)    (0.0005)  (0.0001) 
 After 99M12: Int.differential = -0.519 + 0.009*Time 
 (p-values)    (0.0047)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Separate regression for the interest rate differential (breaks points at 
97M12 and 99M12) without Greece 
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Now to the question: which model is preferred, the 2- or the 3-regime model? As with the 
inflation rate model, we see a clear preference for the 3–regime model. The AIC value for the 
2-regime model is 2.888 while the AIC value for the 2-regime model is 4.346, and the 
likelihood ratio test is highly significant. (The difference of the log-likelihoods is about 150 
which is distributed as a chi-square variable with 1 d.f., the difference of the numbers  of 
parameters between model (2) and (5)). We find an impressive convergence process for the 
inflation rates during the Maastricht regime (see last section) that was matched by a similar 
process for the interest rate differentials. Note that the stabilization process for the 
Amsterdam and the Euroland regime is quite similar. While the slope of the 2nd regime was 
slightly negative, it became positive in the 3rd regime, although both slopes are non-
significant. Concerning hypothesis 4 about the smooth transition, we find again almost 
identical AIC and log-likelihood values for both models. (The AIC value is 2.892). Thus, we 
prefer the smooth transition model for the interest rates convergence. 
Conclusion 2: The convergence for long-term interest rates in the EMU for the first two 
regimes was similar to the convergence process of the inflation rates and has leveled off in 
the last two regimes from January ‘98 to September ’01. The smooth transition model is 
preferred by the data, and a slight divergence effect in mean and variances can be seen for 
the last regime. 
4.3 Annual public deficit to GDP 
The analysis for the annual public deficit is based on annual data. This implies shorter time 
series and the estimation of a 2-regime model, i.e. we will mainly learn about the 
convergence process before and after 1997. Because of pooling the data, we have enough 
d.f. to estimate a 2-regime model, but these yearly estimates are less reliable and 
interpretable than quarterly results. The spline estimates are  
 Before 1998: Ann.Deficit =   5.31% – 0.30%*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.000)   (0.0303) 
 After 1997:    Ann.Deficit =  12.26% – 1.17%*Time 
 (p-values)    (0.000)   (0.0134) 
We see that the EMU countries reduced their annual deficits with an annual rate of 0.3%-
points (p-value = 0.0303). In the second regime the trend was even more evident (-1.2% per 
year with a p-value of 1.3%). The estimated regression line crosses the 3% target line in 
1997.  
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Figure 6: Spline model of the annual deficit for the 11 EMU members 
 
2-regime regression estimates without Greece for the annual deficit: 
 Before 1998: Ann.Deficit =   4.35  –   0.21*Time, 
 (p-values)   (0.000)   (0.0994) 
 After 1997:    Ann.Deficit = 11.52   –  1.10*Time. 
 (p-values)    (0.000)   (0.0063) 
The slope in the first regime is flatter than before and is only significant at a 10% level. This 
means that the hypothesis for non-convergence during the Maastricht regime cannot be 
rejected. The estimated regression line again crosses the 3% line in 1997. In the second 
regime the negative trend is significant, irrespective of Greece being included or not. This 
means that the EMU countries started seriously reducing their annual deficit only in the last 
regimes since 1997. The F-value is highly significant at a .001% level. Note that the general 
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trend has changed for most countries in the last regime, since all countries were still below 
the 3% line for their projected annual deficit in 2001. 
Conclusion 3: On average the EMU members have decreased their annual public deficit 
(ratio to GDP) over the whole period since 1992. Before 1997, in the Maastricht regime, the 
reduction of the deficit was not statistically significant and in addition, no convergence in the 
variances can be seen. Since 1997 the time trend in the means is significant and the 
variance is smaller than in the Maastricht regime. 
4.4 Overall public debt ratio to GDP 
Finally we test if EMU members have decreased the overall public debt ratio on average in 
2000 to 2001. The linear spline model including all the 12 members is estimated as: 
 Before 1998: Debt =  63.48 + 1.45*Time 
 (p-values)  (0.000)   (0.2815) 
 After 1997:    Debt =  105.34 – 3.78*Time 
 (p-values)  (0.000)    (0.1315) 
We see that convergence will not take place in the first regime: on the contrary, we see an 
increase of the overall public debt ratio for regime 1, on average with an annual rate of 
1.45%. But this coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.2815), and in the second 
regime the countries tend to decrease their debt levels by 3.8% per annum; but the slope 
coefficient is also not significant: p-value = 13.15%. Since only 12 annual observations are 
available, this small number of observation can explain this low empirical evidence, i.e. 
leading to insignificant results. Interestingly, the estimated regression line reaches the 60% 
level at the end of our observation period in 2002.  
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Figure 7:  2-regime spline model of the overall public debt ratio (12 EMU members) 
 
The estimates of the 2-regime spline model for public debt (excluding Greece) are: 
 Before 1998: Debt =  61.86+1.20*Time 
 (p-values)   (0.0000)  (0.3891) 
 After 1997:    Debt =  101.22-3.72*Time 
 (p-values)  (0.0000)  (0.1712) 
All estimates and p-values do not change substantially from the previous regression 
including Greece and the fit has not improved.   
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Figure 8:  2-regime model of the overall public debt for (11 EMU countries without 
Greece) 
 
In order to find a significant trend model we have excluded those countries which might 
influence average behavior through extreme values. Such a country is Luxembourg because 
of its low debt ratios (see Figure 8), and Belgium, Italy and Greece with high debt levels on 
the other side. Thus we estimate the aggregate convergence model for the remaining 8 
‘middle’ countries: 
 Before 1998: Debt =  55.57 + 1.25*Time 
 (p-values)  (0.000)  (0.0770) 
 After 1997:    Debt = 94.95 – 3.67*Time 
 (p-values)  (0.000)  (0.0076) 
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For these 8 countries the debt increases 1.25% annually (the p-value is 10%) during the first 
regime until 1997, the F-test is significant. The estimated debt in 1997 is about 65.5%, which 
is above the 60% ceiling target. The level was at 55.6% in 1990, therefore we see a 
divergence until 1997 but a significant debt decreases of 3.7% annually over the second 
regime. Therefore the estimated regression line for the 8 countries crosses the 60% line in 
1999. This means that the 8 countries maintain the trend of reducing their annual deficit until 
2002 with an estimated value of 50.9%.  
 
Figure 9:  Overall public debt for the ‘middle’ EMU members (without Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Greece and Italy) 
 
Conclusion 4: The convergence analysis for annual debts reveals the most heterogeneous 
behavior: during the Amsterdam regime until 1997 the debt ratio was slightly but not 
significantly increasing for 8 “core” countries. Since 1997 the trend is significantly decreasing 
for the remaining 4 countries, too. Overall, after a flat start during the Maastricht regime, a 
general trend of reducing national debts since 1998 can be observed, which continued in 
2000 and 2001. 
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Additionally, the number of EMU members not meeting the 60% target on the overall public 
debt ratio has decreased in 2000 and 2001. Figure 10 shows a steadily decreasing number 
since 1996, particularly in 2000 and 2001. While there were 9 countries exceeding the 60% 
ceiling in 1996, only 7, 6 and 5 did so for 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. This is a sign for 
a small improvement of the debt ratio, but the evidence for a rigorous debt convergence 
remains weak since all countries are required to have a debt ratio lower than 60%. 
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Figure 10: Number of countries with overall debt ratio above 60%  
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5. Is there convergence in the 2nd moments? 
We are interested if in addition to the convergence process in the mean equation (1st 
moments) we can find a convergence process in the variance equations. 
As expected from the scatterplots, also the residual variances of the convergence models 
are decreasing functions of time. This is seen from the following estimations of the spline or 
the separate piecewise regression model with heteroskedastic errors (the appendix 
discusses the specification of these models). 
a) Interest rates: The variance equation of the continuous spline model for the interest rates 
is given by 
Var(Int.Rate) =  0.3623 – 0.00501* Time + 0.000584*(DUM*( Time – 45)) +  
(t-val.)  (6.03)    (-3.59)      (-.365) 
+ 0.006348*(DUM01*(Time – 69)) 
  (12.96) 
The log-likelihood  –243.322 (AIC = .563) is much higher than the model without the 
variance equation with log-likelihood –1295.541 and AIC = 2.888. For the separate 3-regime 
model we have –397.40 and AIC = .914, so we see a clear preference for the spline model. 
b) Inflation rates: The variance equation of the smooth (spline) model for the inflation rates 
is given by the monthly equation 
Var(inflation) = 1*e-05- 7.32e-08*Time + 3.83e-08*(DUM*(Time – 76)) – 1.24e-07* 
   (t-val.)   (4.15)    (-1.91)   (.38)    (.51) 
( DUM01*(Time -100)) 
The log-likelihood is 4214.45 (AIC = –6.96) and is much higher than the model without the 
variance equation having a log-likelihood 3561.1 and AIC = –5.867. In contrast, for the 
separate 3-regime model we find a log-likelihood 4163.35 (AIC = –6.86) and with ARCH: 
3561.4 (AIC = -5.88), so we see a clear preference for the heteroskedastic spline model. 
c) Public debt: The variance equation for the debt ratio was estimated as: 
Var(debt) = 295.96 – 28.84*YEARS + 20.07*DUM9899 – 3.79*(DUM9899*YEARS)  
– 118.9*DUM01 – 15.05*(DUM01*YEARS) 
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Only the YEARS coefficient is statistically significant with a t value of –2.5. The log-likelihood  
–387.75 (AIC = 8.161) is much higher than the model without the variance equation with log-
likelihood –343.09 and AIC = 7.356. For the separate 2-regime model we have -387.6 (AIC = 
8.200) and the model with an ARCH component yields: –346.64 (AIC = 7.51), so we see a 
clear preference for the spline model. 
d) Annual deficit: Summary of the heteroskedastic model 
The log-likelihood is –319.48 (AIC = 4.55) and is much higher than the model without the 
variance equation with log-likelihood –374.43  (AIC = 5.24). For the separate 3-regime model 
we find a log-likelihood of -373.13 (AIC = 5.27); with an additional variance equation the log-
likelihood increases to –321.13 (AIC = 4.65), so we see a clear preference for the spline 
model.  
Note: No coefficient of the variance equation is significant for the separate 2-regime 
regression (therefore it is not shown) while only the YEARS coefficient is significant for the 
spline model. 
e) Convergence analysis according to the 3 regimes: 
1) Inflation rate: 1st: targeted convergence; 2nd: within bounds; 3rd: within bounds. 
 Variance: (significant) decline over time, except for 3rd regime. 
2) Long-term interest rates: 1st: targeted convergence; 2nd: within bounds; 3rd: small 
divergence. 
 Variance: almost significant (t = -1.91) decline over time. 
3) Annual deficit : 1st: no convergence; 2nd to 3rd: significant convergence; 
 Variance: (significant) decline over time in spline model. 
4) (annual) debt ratios: 1st: no convergence; 2nd to 3rd: significant convergence for 
“core” countries; 
 Variance: (significant) decline over time. 
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f) Regression diagnostics: How sensitive are the regimes? 
Also we have made a simple analysis concerning the break points of our 2 or 3-regime 
model with and without heteroskedastic errors. As it turns out, there is no big difference 
between the log-likelihood values or the AIC values if the breakpoint is allowed to change 
over a period of +-3 months from the endpoints of the regimes. We conclude that the choice 
of the break points does not alter our results. 
Table 1: Sensitivity with respect to the break point for inflation rates 
Simple spline model       and      heteroskedastic spline model 
t log-lik.  AIC Het. log-lik.         AIC 
76: 3104.118, -4.65983  3848.860 -5.772892 
74: 3104.183, -4.65993 3836.404 -5.754176 
72: 3104.198 -4.65995 3822.859 -5.733823 
70:  3104.169 -4.660    3809.586 -5.713879 
6. Conclusions  
The paper analyzed the convergence process of the 4 Maastricht variables over the last 12 
years and found 3 rather different regimes since the EMU was established in 1992. While the 
interest rates and the inflation rates converged until 1997, the annual deficit and the public 
debt started declining after 1997. The variance between the EMU countries, a measure for 
heterogeneity, also decreased parallel to the level processes. Our findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The target-oriented convergence for the inflation rate of the EMU countries all 
happened in the Maastricht regime. During the 2nd regime and 3rd regime the time series 
stay within the bounds of the target path. The convergence processes have remained on 
a constant level but the variance of the path has slightly increased in the last regime. 
Over the whole period the spline model is supported; in the 3rd regime from January ‘00 
to September ’01 there is a small tendency for divergence. 
2. The convergence for long-term interest rates in the EMU was impressively strong for 
the first regime and stabilized around the target path for the next two regimes. 
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Interestingly, we find a statistical significant divergence for the last regime from Jan. 
2000 to Sept. 2001, but the amount is rather small at the moment. 
3. During the first (Maastricht) regime the budget discipline in terms of the annual deficit 
was rather weak, which can be seen from the non-significant but negative trend. This 
shows that the EMU countries failed to achieve a targeted convergence during the 
Maastricht regime. Over the second and third regime since 1999, on average, the EMU 
members have decreased their annual public deficit to GDP dramatically, but the trend 
has not yet levelled off. The convergence process of the annual deficit is different with 
respect to two points. First it is characterized only by a convergence of the mean 
process in the 2nd and 3rd regime, while convergence in the second moments has taken 
place (over the whole period). 
4. The behavior of the debt ratios among the EMU countries is rather heterogeneous. A 
majority of 8 EMU countries exhibit a clear decreasing debt-ratio for the last two regimes. 
This trend is shared with the remaining EMU countries for the last two regimes but on 
different levels. While Luxembourg had always been below the 60% target line, 3 
countries of the EMU are still not meeting this threshold. Moreover, we observe a 
targeted positive but not significant trend for the debt-ratio over the first regime. The 
variance of the target path has decreased over the first regime but not over the 2nd and 
3rd regime. 
5. In general, the spline model is supported by the convergence process that indicates a 
“soft landing” of the convergence process at the target levels for inflation and interest 
rates. The model estimates do not show a soft landing for the government debt and 
deficit variables. Compared to the 2-regime model, the 3-regime regression model gives 
a better fit and the likelihood ratio test between the models is significant. 
6. The smooth heteroskedastic convergence model, i.e., the regression model which 
aims at first and second moment convergence, is supported by the data for all 4 
Maastricht criteria. For the ARCH equation, the most important coefficient is the negative 
coefficient of the time variable, for all time series. This shows that the convergence 
process in the first moments (the mean equation) was accompanied by an additional and 
also significant convergence process in the second moments (the variance equation). 
7. Model diagnostics: The pooled cross-sectional convergence model in the present form 
does not allow estimating autoregressive models. Only in a more complex model where 
the time series are modelled independently, the potential autocorrelation can be 
removed from the model estimation. 
Overall we see that the convergence process follows the economic expectations: Interest 
rates are following a more tighter convergence path than inflation rates, because of the 
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market pressures of a common currency and because both are under control of monetary 
authorities, while deficit variables are by nature more volatile and their convergence paths 
have more freedom to deviate from a target.  
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Appendix: Heteroskedastic convergence models 
For modeling the convergence of variances (convergence “in variance”) it is possible to re-
parameterize the variances by a linear function of exogenous regressors. 
a) The heteroskedastic 2-regime spline model is given by a mean and variance equation: 
          yt = a0 + a1 xt + b1 (xt – x*) Dt + ut , 
 Var (ut) = s2t = α0 + α1 xt + β1 (xt – x*)Dt, 
with the dummy variable Dt. This leads to the following variance equations of heteroskedastic 
regression model: 
 Dt = 0:  s2t = α0 + α1 xt   for xt < x*,   
 Dt = 1:  s2t = β0*+ β1* xt ,   for xt > x*. 
The coefficients for regime 2 are β0* = α 0 – β1 x* and  β1* = α 1 + β1. 
b) The separate 2-regime heteroskedastic regression model is specified with a “multiplicative 
dummy” variable Dt 
  yt = a0 + a1 (xt – x*)  + b0 Dt + b1 (xt – x*) Dt + ut , 
 s2t = α0 + α1 (xt – x*) + β0 Dt + β1 (xt – x*) Dt . 
c) The separate 3-regime heteroskedastic regression model has the following mean and 
variance equation: 
         yt = a0 + a1 (xt – xa*)  + b0 Dat + b1 (xt – xa*) Dat + c0 Dct + c1 (xt – xc*) Dct  + ut , 
 Var(ut) = s2t = α0 + α1 (xt – xa*) + β0 Dat + β1 (xt – xa*) Dat + γ0 Dct + γ1(xt – xc*) Dct  
where Dat and Dct are the dummy variables for the regimes A and B, respectively. 
d) Finally, the heteroskedastic 3-regime spline model has the form: 
         yt = a0 + a1 (xt – xa*) + b1 (xt – xa*) Dat + c1 (xt – xc*) Dct + ut , 
 Var (ut) = s2t = α0 + α1 (xt – xa*) + β1 (xt – xa*) Dat + γ1 (xt – xc*) Dct . 
The heteroskedastic regimes are given as 
1st regime, Dat = 0:  s2t = α0 + α1 (xt – xa*) ; 
2nd regime, Dat = 1:  s2t = α0 + β0 + (α1 + β1)(xt – xa*); 
3rd regime, Dat = 1 and  Dct = 1: 
   s2t = α0 + β0 + γ0 + (α1 + β1+ γ1)(xt – xc*) + γ1(xa* – xc*). 
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